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James R. O’Donnell, Jr., Ph.D.*, and Gary Welter† 
During launch and early operation of the Global Precipitation Measurement 
(GPM) Mission, the Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) analysis team 
encountered four main on-orbit anomalies. These include: (1) unexpected shock 
from Solar Array deployment, (2) momentum buildup from the Magnetic Torquer 
Bars (MTBs) phasing errors, (3) transition into Safehold due to albedo induced 
Course Sun Sensor (CSS) anomaly, and (4) a flight software error that could cause 
a Safehold transition due to a Star Tracker occultation. This paper will discuss 
ways GN&C engineers identified the anomalies and tracked down the root causes. 
Flight data and GN&C on-board models will be shown to illustrate how each of 
these anomalies were investigated and mitigated before causing any harm to the 
spacecraft. On May 29, 2014, GPM was handed over to the Mission Flight Oper-
ations Team after a successful commissioning period. Currently, GPM is operat-
ing nominally on orbit, collecting meaningful scientific data that will significantly 
improve our understanding of the Earth’s climate and water cycle. 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 27, 2014, the Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) core observatory launched 
on a Japanese H-IIA launch vehicle from Tanegashima Space Center, located on the Japanese island 
of Tanegashima, Japan. GPM is an international partnership mission designed to help understand 
global precipitation and its effects on humankind. NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) 
developed this project with the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency. GPM core is part of an in-
ternational constellation of Earth Science missions that will aid in improving the understanding of 
global precipitation and the Earth’s water cycle. With the addition of GPM, these satellites gather 
global information on rain, snow, ice, and other global weather phenomena approximately every 
three hours. Scientists are able to use GPM data to help advance our understanding of Earth's water 
and energy cycles, improve the forecasting of extreme events that cause natural disasters, and ex-
tend current capabilities of using satellite precipitation information to directly benefit society.  
GPM is a Low-Earth orbiting, nadir pointing satellite flying at an altitude of 400km with a 65° 
orbital inclination. The GPM spacecraft was designed for a three-year mission, with controlled 
reentry planned at end of life. It is equipped with two science instruments: the GPM Microwave 
Imager (GMI) and the Dual-Frequency Precipitation Radar (DPR) system. The GMI is a microwave 
radiometer, and the DPR is a precipitation radar system, consisting of Ku and Ka band radars. Data 
from these instruments are combined to provide three-dimensional precipitation observations, as 
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well as an accurate rainfall rate. In order to give meaningful information, these instruments require 
precise pointing control with knowledge of 2.8 arcmin, 3-sigma about each axis. The GPM Guid-
ance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) system is responsible for controlling spacecraft attitude 
during nominal operations, orienting the spacecraft during instrument calibration maneuvers, com-
manding the solar arrays (SA) and high-gain antenna (HGA), controlling the spacecraft propulsion 
system for orbit maintenance and controlled reentry, and for spacecraft system momentum man-
agement. Figure 1 provides an image of GPM with the body coordinate system axes. Here, the 
GMI, DPR, HGA and two SA’s are identified.  
 
Figure 1: Diagram of GPM.  
To ensure accurate control of the spacecraft and science instruments, GPM is equipped with a 
number of on-board sensors and actuators. These sensors include a Northrup Grumman Scalable 
Space Inertial Reference Unit (SSIRU), 24 Adcole Coarse Sun Sensors (CSSs), 2 Medium Sun 
Sensors (MSSs) each composed of 2 Adcole Coarse Analog Sun Sensors 1, 2 Macintyre Electronic 
Design Associates Three-Axis Magnetometers (TAMs), 2 Selex Galileo Star Trackers (STs), 2 in-
house designed and built GSFC Navigator Global Positioning System (GPS) Receivers2, and an 
optical encoder for each of the 4 SA/HGA gimbals. The actuator suite consists of 5 in-house de-
signed and built GSFC Demiseable Integrated Reaction Wheel Assemblies (RWAs), 12 Aerojet 
22-Newton thrusters, 3 dual-winding Goodrich Space Systems Torque Rods (Magnetic Torquer 
Bars, MTBs), and the GSFC dual wound SA/HGA gimbal motors. For the most part, these sensors 
and actuators were divided into the A-side and B-side of the spacecraft. 
The GN&C subsystem is composed of six different control modes, each of which uses different 
combinations of the on-board actuators and sensors to ensure the spacecraft is in the safe and stable 
orientation needed to accomplish each controller’s goal. The six control modes, most of which will 
be discussed in the course of the timeline below, are Rate Null, Sun Point, Slew, Delta H, Delta V, 
and Mission Science Modes. Mission Science Mode (MSM) is the control mode used for collecting 
science data. A number of constraints were taken into account when designing this control mode. 
For example, due to thermal constraints, the Sun is typically kept on the –Y side of the spacecraft. 










the body-fixed flight coordinate reference frame is in line with the Geodetic coordinate reference 
frame. 
To ensure success of the science mission, GPM was designed to be single fault tolerant. In the 
event of any hardware or performance issue, a fault/failure detection feature was designed to au-
tonomously ensure spacecraft safety, thus adhering to the NASA Reliability, Redundancy and Fault 
Tolerance safety design requirements. This Fault Detection and Correction (FDC) system compares 
spacecraft performance with “nominal” expectations. In cases where the spacecraft is not perform-
ing as expected, FDC will flag this behavior and start a sequence to safe the spacecraft until engi-
neers can determine what corrective action(s) to take. When an FDC flag trips, it triggers an Action 
Point (AP). Each AP, when triggered, will start a Relative Time Sequence (RTS), which ultimately 
changes the configuration of the spacecraft based on predetermined safing precautions. This system 
is intended to confirm the spacecraft hardware is performing as expected, ensuring that the satellite 
stays in a safe and stable configuration. A number of the following anomalies caused an FDC trip.  
POST-LAUNCH TIMELINE AND FLIGHT ANOMALIES 
The GPM satellite was launched February 27th, Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) 058/18:37 on a 
Japanese H-IIA rocket. Launch configuration for GPM included the RWAs, STs, and GPS receivers 
off, while the IRUs and both Analog & Torquer Bar (ATB) command cards were powered on. As 
a result, prior to launch and separation, GN&C engineers were mostly monitoring the gyro rates. 
Approximately 10 minutes after liftoff, GMT 058/18:47, GN&C engineers started receiving data 
from the spacecraft. Post separation, the GN&C subsystem had a requirement to null spacecraft 
vehicle rates within 30 minutes using the 5 RWAs if the initial tip-off rates were less than ± [0.5, 
1.0, 1.0] deg/sec. A little over 6 minutes after receiving data from the spacecraft, GMT 18:53, 
fairing separation was detected. The satellite was released from the launch vehicle with low residual 
spacecraft body rates of [0.004, 0.019, -0.039] deg/sec about the [x, y, z] axes, respectively. At this 
point, the RWAs were autonomously powered and the spacecraft transitioned into Rate Null Mode 
to remove any rate errors. These residual rates were removed in less than 20 seconds. Subsequently, 
the spacecraft transitioned to Sun Point Mode (SPM), and proceeded to acquire its Sun-pointing 
attitude. After switching to SPM, engineers began the process of early checkout activities for GPM.  
For this satellite, early checkout included powering and verification of all on-board hardware 
systems. SA deployment began autonomously at GMT 058/19:03, approximately 10 minutes after 
separation. The first anomaly was detected at this time. It is discussed in detail in the section entitled 
‘Flight Anomaly 1.’ During SA deployment, an FDC flag was triggered, causing the spacecraft to 
autonomously switch to Safehold on the B-side. In the GPM design, Safehold was considered a 
spacecraft state; the attitude control system mode used during Safehold is SPM. Once the root cause 
was understood, GN&C engineers sent the command to swap back to the A-side, since all the au-
tonomous FDC was designed assuming the A-side was in control.  
 Shortly after the sun pointing attitude was achieved and the deployment transients had settled, 
GN&C engineers detected a slow system momentum increase tracked down to a phasing error on 
the MTBs. Since both ATBs showed similar readings for this issue, a new alignment table was 
uploaded to the spacecraft for correction. This anomaly is described in detail in the ‘Flight Anomaly 
2’ section below.  
At GMT 058/22:15, ST-A was powered on for checkout and performance of the ST was veri-
fied. The HGA deployment process started at GMT 059/01:04, approximately 2 hours later. This 
deployment involved the antenna folding out from the stowed launch configuration and locking 
into its final position for the duration of the mission. GN&C engineers were able to verify HGA 
deployment and locking by looking at the spacecraft system momentum response at GMT 
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059/01:16. Following the verification of ST-A, ST-B was powered on at GMT 059/01:50 for veri-
fication. After performance of ST-B was verified, both STs were left in a powered state. Though 
only one ST is used for spacecraft control, both STs are left powered in order to have a hot backup 
and to monitor the health and performance of the backup ST.  
The GPS Navigators (Nav-A and Nav-B) were the next GN&C hardware to be tested on-board. 
Nav-B was powered on first, at GMT 059/02:14, and Nav-A was powered on 4 minutes later. The 
objective was to gather at least 1 orbit of parallel data in order to verify the solutions and monitor 
time data for both navigators. The Navigators produced both point solutions and filtered solutions 
using the Goddard-developed GPS-Enhanced Onboard Navigation System (GEONS) filter. Solu-
tions from each Navigator were compared to each other and to ground determined solutions. Upon 
initiation, a valid point solution from each navigator was successfully detected from the very first 
telemetry point. Both Navigators showed consistent readings at initial powering. The point solu-
tions were within 5m position and 5cm/s velocity for the two receivers. The GEONS3 filtered so-
lutions were within 5m position and 1cm/s velocity. Both GPS receivers were kept on for a day and 
a half at the request of the Navigator hardware lead, in order to get as much data as possible before 
GPS-B was turned off for the duration of the nominal mission. The only Navigator related con-
straint was that one receiver had to be off prior to initiation of the DPR instrument, so this data 
collection did not disrupt any nominal path forward. Following checkout of the Navigators, GPS-
B was powered off. This concluded the powering and verification of all GN&C hardware compo-
nents.  
GPM successfully completed initial checkout activities at GMT 059/06:00. At GMT 059/12:25, 
once the spacecraft was deemed safe for geodetic nadir pointing, the command to slew to MSM 
was sent. Once in MSM, verification and calibration of science functions, including DPR offset 
calibration and GMI deep space calibration, could begin. Shortly after entering MSM, the space-
craft was autonomously sent back to SPM due to an FDC flag. The FDC failure was determined to 
be a result of high albedo influencing the hardware determined sun vector, and is described in detail 
in the ‘Flight Anomaly 3’ section below. After engineers determined the reason this flag tripped, 
the decision was made to passivate the corrective actions following the FDC detection until further 
information could be collected. 
On GMT 068, 10 days after liftoff, another FDC detected Kalman Filter (KF) error nearly sent 
the Observatory to SPM again. This anomaly, discussed in the ‘Flight Anomaly 4’ section below, 
was linked to an error in the Flight Software only seen after ST occultation. Once this anomaly was 
understood, the spacecraft was sent back to MSM and workarounds were put in place to compensate 
for the FSW error until the flight code could be corrected.  
Overall, the GN&C subsystem performed well during the first few days of the mission. The 
anomalies mentioned above are described in further detail in the subsequent sections. 
Flight Anomaly 1: Solar Array Deployment Dynamics 
The first unexpected activity of the launch sequence occurred shortly after separation from the 
launch vehicle. At approximately 10 minutes after positive separation indication, the two solar ar-
rays were set to autonomously deploy. GPM used non-explosive actuators for release of the array 
launch restraints and deployment of the arrays. The sequence began as expected, and the array 
deployment itself completed with no issues. However, the on-board FDC software detected a rapid 
increase in the total system angular momentum and took actions to ensure the safety of the space-
craft.  
The FDC check on delta system momentum is primarily meant to detect propulsion system 
failures. The check trips a software flag if the change in system momentum is higher than 5 Nms 
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for 3 consecutive software cycles. It has a quick response time (<500ms, nominally) in order to 
detect and correct accelerations due to inadvertent thruster pulsing. Upon detection of an anomalous 
angular acceleration, the system closes all propulsion latch valves and sends the spacecraft to its 
sun-pointing orientation in SPM.  
During the Launch and Early Operations sequence, real-time telemetry is limited due to the 
available bandwidth of the S-band link. On-board telemetry is also down-sampled to once per 10 
seconds in order to conserve data storage space. This telemetry sampling made reconstruction of 
the events surrounding the FDC actions difficult. However, enough data was collected to show 
substantial change in system momentum had occurred (Figure 2). Large jumps in the estimated 
system momentum occurred at approximately Sep+610 seconds and Sep+655 seconds. From the 
event log, it was during the second of these two events that the FDC check failed. It cannot be seen 
from the down-sampled, on-board storage data whether there was sufficient change over three 10Hz 
cycles to warrant the actions, but there is enough circumstantial evidence to conclude that the sys-
tem responded to the unexpected large torques on the body due to the solar array deployment.  
 
Figure 2: System Momentum Estimate During Solar Array Deployment. 
In this instance, the GPM spacecraft was already configured for nominal Safehold, acquiring 
the sun, and had the latch valves closed, so fewer actions were actually taken by the on-board 
software. In particular, the B-side CSSs, MSSs, and MTBs were selected for use. Some minimal 
effort was needed to put the system back into its nominal post-launch configuration and continue 
checkout activities. 
In retrospect, more analysis could have been done on the actual solar array deployment and the 
dynamic interaction with the GPM core body. Also, the FDC check on delta system momentum 
could have been disabled until after solar array deployment. Given the resources needed for the 
dynamic analysis, and the low risk of propulsion issues prior to propulsion system checkout, the 
latter would have likely been the recommended choice. 













Seconds Since LV Separation 
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Flight Anomaly 2: Angular Momentum Build-up 
After the transients of separation from the launch vehicle, initial deployments, and Sun acquisition 
had settled, the GN&C engineers on console in the GPM launch support room observed that the 
observatory system momentum was slowly increasing (Figure 3). Although limited real-time 
telemetry was available and the spacecraft dynamics were not yet quiescent, the experience of the 
engineers on console with simulations and performance testing led to additional scrutiny of the 
trend. At this point, less than one full orbit’s worth of data had been collected and the existence of 
an anomaly was not a certainty. However, the GPM Systems Engineering team was notified 
immediately of the concern and the decision was made to continue monitoring the data trend and 
consult the contingency documentation to eliminate potential sources of the issue. 
 
Figure 3: System Momentum Trend During First Hour. 
The decision to wait and monitor was based on several factors. First, the cyclic nature of disturbance 
torque from aerodynamic drag for an inertial pointing spacecraft induces that same kind of cyclic 
response in the system momentum. In addition, the low bandwidth momentum management 
controller cannot completely compensate for this effect using the MTBs due to the physical 
constraints of Earth’s magnetic field, and tends to induce a parasitic momentum effect that is orbital 
in period. Lastly, the current system momentum levels were less than 10% of the capability of the 
5 reaction wheels. 
The engineering team consulted the contingency flows to verify their initial supposition: the 
polarity of the MTBs was reversed. Data from the SIRU, magnetometers, and reaction wheels were 
revisited to verify their proper performance. Also, some consideration was given to the possibility 
that only one or two of the three bars had its polarity reversed, but the indication from the data and 
the review of the ground test program gave confidence that the issue was with all three MTBs. 
Approximately 90 minutes into the mission, an anomaly was declared and the MTB current drive 
was overridden to zero while new software tables were being prepared for upload. Once the MTB 
current was overridden, the rate of momentum growth noticeably decreased, giving the engineers 
on console more confidence of the source of the problem. 
A new flight software table was generated that negated the orientation of the MTB axes in the 
body frame. Care was taken to ensure the validity of the table prior to the upload and after the load 
GPM System Momentum Estimate














was complete. The upload sequence took about 20 minutes and 6 hours and 5 minutes after sepa-
ration from the launch vehicle, the new tables took effect. Within 30 minutes, the total system 
momentum had decreased by 30%. Nominal momentum levels were reached less than an orbit after 
the new tables took effect. The new tables were burned into EEPROM on both processor sides so 
that any further entry into Safehold would be in the correct momentum management configuration, 
allowing for fault tolerance. 
 
 
Figure 4: System Momentum Trend During MTB Anomaly. 
After GPM commissioning activities were concluded, an investigation into the cause of the 
phasing issue was conducted. This investigation looked into the vendor documentation, test equip-
ment, and testing documentation. Ultimately, it was determined that the anomaly occurred because 
of both incorrect assumptions about the field direction as stated in the MTB documentation and an 
incorrect understanding of the ground test magnetometer instrument. The test campaign should 
have caught the issues, but the test was not properly set-up to distinguish phasing errors in the 
spacecraft body axes. Also, the same team that defined the test approach was also the team who 
reviewed the results of the phasing tests.  Any incorrect assumptions that went into designing the 
test were also used in determining the success criteria. No external project review of the phasing 
test procedures and results was conducted, which likely would have flagged the approach as a po-
tential issue. 
Flight Anomaly 3: Sun Vector Discrepancy 
Shortly after entering MSM using a nadir tracking target, the spacecraft unexpectedly went into 
Safehold due to one of the autonomous FDC tests. The test that failed compares the Sun vector 
calculated using the CSSs against the Sun vector calculated using the on-board models (OM) Sun 
vector and estimated attitude from the KF. This particular test is intended to be a “last resort” com-
parison between the very basic CSS Sun vector estimate and the State Determination (SD) Sun 
vector that relies on the SSIRU and ST. The original test criteria was that the angular error between 
the two Sun vectors had to exceed 20 degrees for 2 minutes. Albedo was expected to be a potential 
issue for the CSS estimated Sun vector, but it was thought that a 20 degree limit for 2 minutes 
would not be exceeded erroneously.  
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Once the spacecraft was safely pointed on the Sun line in SPM, the GN&C engineers checked 
out the hardware and confirmed that everything was performing nominally. No other FDCs had 
failed and the STs, SSIRU, and CSSs were all functioning as expected. The decision was made to 
passivate that particular FDC, transition the spacecraft back to MSM, and continue with the inves-
tigation as to why that particular FDC failed. With the FDC in passive mode, as opposed to being 
disabled, event messages would still be sent when FDC limits were exceeded. Once back in MSM 
and nadir tracking, it was observed that that particular FDC continued to exceed limits every orbit 
around the same point in the orbit ground track. As can be seen in Figure 5, the Sun angle error 
FDC was tripping right above the coast of Antarctica. The premise was then that the reflection of 
the Sun on the snow and ice was causing the CSS Sun vector to have a larger error.  
 
Figure 5: GPM Ground Track Map at Time of CSS Sun Vector FDC Trip. 
Figure 6, shows the angular error between the CSS Sun vector and the SD/OM Sun vector for 
one day’s worth of orbits. As can be seen in the Figure, the FDC limit was being exceeded almost 
every orbit. As designed, the FDC test was not going to work effectively. New limits and persis-
tence would have to be established prior to enabling that particular FDC again. Because the GN&C 
team also believed that the error could also be dependent on Beta angle and season, it was decided 
to collect data for a long period of time prior to selecting new limits.  
  9
 
Figure 6: State Determination/CSS Sun Angle Error.  
Using data collected over several months, the GN&C team suggested increasing the angular 
error limit to 30 degrees and the persistence to 5 minutes. Even though angular errors greater than 
30 degrees had been seen, it was felt that increasing the limit more than that would effectively 
disable the FDC check entirely. It was believed that increasing the persistence to 5 minutes would 
account for potential exceedences. These changes were implemented shortly thereafter, but, since 
there were other FDCs in place to monitor the performance of the State Determination, it was de-
cided to leave the Sun Vector FDC in passive mode for a while longer to monitor the new limit and 
persistence. At this point in time, the FDC is still in passive mode.  
Flight Anomaly 4: Delta Quaternion 
On March 9, 2014 (Day of Year 068), the GPM Core Observatory entered a period in which the 
ST was being occulted by the moon every orbit. This type of occultation results in the ST falling 
out of its tracking mode. The on-board FDC would then automatically promote it back to tracking 
mode following the end of the computed occultation period. Upon reacquisition of ST data each 
orbit, one of the KF related APs tripped. The fault that tripped was AP-86, the ST-KF Adjusted 
Residual Error check. This particular check compares the delta quaternion between the gyro-prop-
agated attitude solution and the ST-based attitude solution against a limit. This delta quaternion 
would normally be expected to be near zero, even after a lunar occultation. 
Tripping of this AP with 60-second persistence had two effects. It reset the KF, and activated 
AP-87, which provided a second tier of response to KF failures. In the event of further KF FDC 
failures, if AP-87 was tripped one of the results would be for the spacecraft to transition to SPM. 
This configuration was meant to guard against persistent KF problems, but because lunar occulta-
tions would be occurring every orbit for a number of days, the same fault that tripped AP-86 would 
trip AP-87 the next orbit if left active, causing an unnecessary transition to SPM. For the first 
several orbits, AP-86 and AP-87 were manually managed by disabling the active AP, and resetting 
and re-enabling the other. Managing these APs every orbit became operationally cumbersome, so 
an alternative solution was desired. 
As a stop gap to determining the cause of the apparent large KF residuals and to avoid an unde-
sired and unnecessary transition to SPM, the RTS used to re-promote the ST back to its tracking 
mode was augmented so that 10 seconds after the ST is re-promoted to tracking mode, the KF is 
Hours since 04-Mar-2014 00:00:00
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reset, restoring small residual values before the 60-second limit that would cause AP-86 to trip and 
activate AP-87.  
Once the operational workaround was implemented, further investigation into the root cause of 
the FDC failure continued. The problem was tracked down to a combination of the calculation of 
the delta quaternion between the ST measurement and the SIRU propagated solution and the fact 
that the ST generated attitude quaternion always selects a positive fourth component upon entering 
its tracking mode.  
A given Earth Centered Inertial (ECI)-to-device attitude (the device being either ST or space-
craft in this context) can be represented in quaternion form as one of two rotations, one in the range 
[0, ], and the other in the range [, 2] in the opposite direction. The ST, when promoted to 
tracking mode, selects the first convention for representing its attitude solution. As long as the ST 
remains in tracking mode, subsequent cycle-to-cycle solutions are selected to have the minimum 
apparent angular change from the previous solution. Since GPM has a continuous 1-Rotation per 
Orbit motion when nadir tracking, this convention, combined with the nature of quaternion mathe-
matics, results in a smooth variation of the ST quaternion components over a two-orbit period, with 
one orbit having the [0, ] convention, and the next having the [, 2] convention. 
Figures 7 and 8 show plots of the fourth component of the ECI-to-ST and ST-based ECI-to-
spacecraft quaternions over a 12 hour period that includes four orbits preceding the lunar occulta-
tions of March 2014 and four orbits that include occultations. Note the 2-hour quaternion periodic-
ity when there is no ST reset and the once-per-orbit ST phase reset to positive fourth component 
with the occultations. The ST-based ECI-to-S/C phase jump occurs when the ST returns to track 
mode. 
 
Figure 7: ST-A quaternion fourth component 
 
Figure 8: ST-based ECI-to-S/C quaternion fourth component 
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Figure 9 shows a plot of the fourth component of the gyro propagated ECI-to-spacecraft qua-
ternion over the same 12 hour period. Note that there are also phase jumps in this quaternion, how-
ever those phase jumps coincide with when the KF was reset. Upon reception of a KF enable com-
mand, the KF synchronizes its ECI-to-spacecraft rotation convention based on that of the ST. This 
solution is propagated forward, cycle-to-cycle, using gyro data and will follow the same two-orbit 
periodicity in solution convention described above. So long as the ST remains in track mode, the 
new ST-based solution and the gyro-propagated solution will remain phase locked with respect to 
solution convention and the estimated attitude difference between the two will remain small (on 
the order of ST noise).  
However, whenever the ST falls out of track mode and then is re-promoted to track mode, the 
solution will start in the [0, ] phase. If this happens to not be the phase that would have pertained 
if the ST mode had not cycled, the ST-based ECI-to-spacecraft attitude solution and the gyro-prop-
agated attitude solution will be 2 out of phase with each other. Recall that the FDC check that 
failed was the error between the ST-based ECI to spacecraft attitude solution and the gyro propa-
gated attitude solution. Typically, when such delta quaternions are calculated, the fourth component 
of the quaternion is forced to have a positive value, thus ensuring the calculation is close to zero. 
Further investigation into the Flight Software calculation of the delta quaternion calculation 
revealed that it was not enforcing a positive fourth component after the delta quaternion was cal-
culated and therefore the resulting quaternion error was seen to be close to 2, rather than close to 
0. Resetting the KF causes the KF attitude solution, and the gyro-propagation thereof, to resynchro-
nize with the phase of the ST-based ECI-to-S/C attitude solution, thus restoring the difference be-
tween the two solutions to be near 0. 
 
Figure 9: Gyro-propagated ECI-to-S/C quaternion fourth 
A solution to the problem was determined to be a repair in the FSW by forcing the use of the 
[0, ] phase convention on the delta-quaternion, residual rotation (i.e., force a non-negative fourth 
component of the delta quaternion) between ST-based attitude and the gyro propagated attitude in 
the KF utility code. This FSW update was thoroughly evaluated for spacecraft affects before being 
uploaded to the satellite. 
 CONCLUSION 
On May 29, 2014, the GPM Core Observatory was successfully handed over to the Mission 
Flight Operations Team at GSFC in Greenbelt Maryland. No mission is without its surprises, but 
the GN&C team was able to look at the behavior of the spacecraft and identify where the potential 
spacecraft or hardware issues were. The attention and dedication of the GPM team enabled all 
anomalies to be mitigated in a timely manner before any additional issues were realized. This paper 
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described the importance of paying close attention to the minor details. It is these details that can 
potentially compound and cause issues for the spacecraft.  
Ten days after launch, GPM was able to capture first of its kind images of precipitation inside 
a cyclone over the North West Pacific Ocean. Following several instrument calibrations and veri-
fications, GPM released its first public data set in June, 2014. It is currently on orbit, collecting 
meaningful scientific data. 
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